The recent events show a deterioration in the political and economic relationship between Poland and Ukraine. It is a bit overwhelming to process all this information, so this article will contain a recap of the events and some important conclusions.

Situation in the beginning of the war

Poland and Ukraine have never been close friends, it is evident from history. There have been a lot of ethnic and religious conflicts, but despite all the misunderstandings, Poland was one of the first to answer Ukraine’s call for help when Russia started the full-scale invasion. From that time, Ukraine’s western neighbor has done a lot, from providing shelter to the refugees to supplying arms. As of May 31, 2023, Poland’s support to Ukraine was estimated to be about 3.527 billion euro, with more than a half of that in military aid. What is more, the Polish government was the first to issue a statement about its eagerness to provide tanks to Ukraine, encouraging other countries to do so as well which laid the foundation of the European tank coalition. Most of the military aid transported to Ukraine is delivered to Rzeszów-Jasionka airport in Poland, where the NATO weapons hub was established in winter 2022, and only after that directly to Ukraine. Sounds perfect, doesn’t it? So, what has changed, what could possibly be a reason for deterioration in this relationship? The answer is the grain dispute.

Ukraine’s grain problem before

According to the economic data, one of Ukraine’s most important exports is grain. Once Ukraine was called “the granary of Europe” and now Ukraine remains among the world’s leading grain exporters. When Russia started the war, the main sea routes through which inexpensive Ukrainian grain was transported to the countries in need, were obstructed by the Russian navy. Since the goods in question are the main source of income for Ukraine, Kyiv started searching desperately for new ways of export. For this reason, the Black Sea Grain Initiative was started on 22 July 2022. This agreement was signed by Ukraine, Russia, United Nations, and Turkey, which controls the maritime routes from the Black Sea. It guaranteed safe export of grain from certain Ukrainian ports to prevent a global food crisis, with establishing a joint coordination and inspection center in Turkey. The BSGI was not a solution though, because the very next day after signing the agreement Russia conducted bombing of the Odesa trade port (one of the ports used in the framework of BSGI). Aside from that, Russia has been constantly issuing threats to back out from the agreement if its demands were not satisfied and interrupting the grain transport. Following all that, on 17 July 2023 Russia refused to renew the deal and started the blockade of Ukrainian ports. That is why a new way had to be found.

Search for a new way

Following the failure of the maritime route option, Ukraine started to pursue ways of exporting grain overland. Earlier, in June 2022, new transport agreements were signed between Ukraine, Moldova, and the EU. These agreements removed the importance of transport permits for hauliers to operate between the territories of the signatories of the deal. This marked the beginning of the European Solidarity Lanes project. In July 2022, four European Transport Corridors were linked with Moldova and Ukraine. In June 2023, Ukraine became a member of the Connecting Europe Facility, which enabled better connection between Ukraine and the EU. But prior to the end of the BSGI, Solidarity Lanes were not the main option for transporting grain abroad from Ukraine. They were only used to deal with the excess grain which was not possible to export by sea. When Russia sabotaged the maritime route, they became the only alternative.

New problems arise

The issue was that the countries neighboring Ukraine were not ready for the consequences of the massive surge in grain transport across their borders. After some time, it became evident that the redirection of goods from the European Union to the third countries was unexpectedly complicated, therefore the excess grain stayed in the European market. The change in logistics after the end of BSGI would have caused a wave of cheap grain to flood the markets of the neighbors of Ukraine even more. Fearing the consequences, they started to introduce bans on Ukrainian grain.

In May 2023 the European Commission introduced a ban on wheat, corn, rapeseed, and sunflower imports from Ukraine to Bulgaria, Hungary, Slovakia, Romania, and Poland. On the 5^th of June the ban was prolonged until September 15. After the series of negotiations and the agreement on bilateral control of the export amount, on the 15^th of September the European Commission issued a statement that the restrictions would not be prolonged any further. Despite that, several countries including Poland unilaterally extended the restrictions.

Polish Context

Let us now focus on Poland. It is without any doubt that overflowing the market with cheap goods comes to no good, but why was this question so important for the above-mentioned country?

The first reason is economics. The Polish economy heavily relies on farmers. In recent years, Poland has invested in its agricultural infrastructure to compete in the European market. An unregulated wave of inexpensive grain would lead to bankruptcy of many farms that were carefully cherished, and, potentially, the collapse of the entire economy. Moreover, Ukraine may become a direct economic adversary of Poland in the near future when it joins the EU. Since grain from Ukraine is cheaper than that grown in Poland, the latter is interested in limiting the former’s connection to the market. In addition to that, Polish authorities viewed the overflow of goods as an attempt of Ukrainian oligarchs to destabilize and control the market.

The second reason is political. Farmers form the biggest interest group of voters in Poland. So, in the light of coming parliamentary elections on 15^th of October the ruling populist anti-European party PiS (Prawo i Sprawiedliwość/Law and Justice) was doing everything in order to secure the most votes.

But not everything is so one-sided: according to the data from the 20^th International Dairy Cooperatives Forum, because of the shortage of their own grain caused by the drought, dairy farmers from Eastern Poland were forced to buy fodder in Lithuania, which is a lot more expensive than Ukrainian. They did not understand the logic behind the restrictions.

When Diplomats Enter the Fight

• Following the introduction of unilateral ban from Poland, Ukraine filed a World Trade Organization litigation against Poland, which was later paused, so the process itself resembled a threat more than an actual proceeding. Moreover, Ukraine threatened to introduce a ban on Polish vegetables.
• On the 20^th of September 2023, on the Polsat News Polish prime minister Mateusz Morawiecki said that Poland is no longer providing military supplies to Ukraine because Poland must arm itself, though the military hub in Rzeszów will continue operation.
• On the 24^th of September, Andrzej Duda, the president of Poland, issued a statement about readiness of the transit corridors which will allow Ukrainian grain to move through Poland to third countries without impacting the market.
• During the meeting of the ministers of agriculture of the Visegrad Group, Czechia, Hungary, Slovakia, and Poland requested a thorough check of the EU Solidarity Lanes.
• On October 3, Poland and Ukraine announced about reaching an agreement to continue grain transit and make it easier.

Current State of Affairs

The parliamentary elections were held on October 15 and their result turned out to be quite unexpected for PiS: for the first time in eight years, they failed to secure the majority in Sejm and form the government. Three opposition forces (Civic Coalition, Third Way, and The Left) announced creating a coalition. What does it mean for Ukraine? To begin with, in recent years Poland was receiving almost no money from the EU because of a number of laws, adopted by PiS, aimed at extending the right of the government and the parliament to appoint judges, which violated the European rule of law principle. With the coming to power of a new liberal pro-European government, the situation can change, resulting in the flow of investments. This will alleviate the concerns of poles about money spent on aid for Ukraine and related projects. Since PiS is not as influential now, the grain conflict with Ukraine will most certainly deflate, because the ruling party was inflating the conflict and used it to gain the sympathies of the voters.

That is not the only change. In October 2023, despite the risks of Russian attacks, Ukraine established its own new grain export corridor in the Black Sea, accompanying it with missile strikes on Russian navy and military objects, including the HQ of the Black Sea fleet. This endeavor turned out to be more successful than the BSGI, allowing Ukraine to transport not only grain, but also metals. This means that theoretically Poland will not experience the huge increase in transported goods, which will certainly ease the tension.

So far, we can see positive tendencies in the dynamic of the relations between the neighboring countries, but nevertheless, the question persists: will the Polish-Ukrainian relations endure the challenges, both historical and modern, and stay as strong, as they were in the beginning of the full-scale Russian invasion?