Author’s Note: I wrote this paper for the course JPB024: Israel’s Foreign Policy, on April 14th, 2024. I am now publishing it here, with only minor modifications, in May 2024.
Given the nature of the Israel-Hamas war, the analysis presented here is already outdated. In the elapsed month, PM Netanyahu has gone ahead with the invasion of Rafah, student protests have surged across the United States and internationally, demanding for an end to the violence. President Biden himself now calls for a ceasefire, and has delayed arms shipments to Israel over concerns of US weapons being used to commit war crimes. However, while not explicitly mentioned in the analysis below, these events only compound the conclusions I reached. Please, take it with a grain of salt, but do not discount the following essay.
“We have a special relationship with Israel. It’s absolutely crucial that no one in our country or around the world ever doubt that our number one commitment in the Middle East is to protect the right of Israel to exist, to exist permanently, and to exist in peace. It’s a special relationship.”
Former President Jimmy Carter – (Presidents News Conference, May 12, 1977)
There is no other interstate relationship like that of Israel and the United States. The state of Israel is very dependent on United States’ support; militarily but also economically and diplomatically, it draws its strength from its close relationship with the US. Despite this, Prime Minister Netanyahu has become more defiant of the US, expecting the superpower to always take his side, or inserting himself into domestic US politics. One might expect the US to be harsher on Israel, but instead every presidential administration has increased commitment to Israel, through UN vetoes and military aid (Rettig 2024). However, a number of domestic and international pressures are building slowly towards a change. As a catalyst, the war in Gaza has the potential to once and for all uproot the American permissive attitude towards Israel, provided President Biden’s administration dares to use their leverage and condition aid.
Changes in US-Israel Relations During the War
For the first few months, any tensions between parties were put aside for strategic cooperation following the shock of the initial October 7 attacks (Freilich 2024). However, as time went on, frustration returned stronger than before (Freilich 2024). On March 25th, the US abstained from a UNSC vote, instead of exercising its veto power, and passed a resolution demanding an immediate ceasefire. Recognizing the changed position of the US, Prime Minister Netanyahu canceled an upcoming delegation to the White House. In the past, the US has vetoed any resolution remotely negative towards Israel, but perhaps out of respect for the security council as an international authority, the resolution was allowed to pass after many months. It may be that Netanyahu ‘overplayed’ his hand here, as the meeting did in fact occur later on, but only after he made his reluctance known (Detsch and Gramer 2024). Earlier that week, Netanyahu had already defied the US once by announcing the largest land seizure since 1993 in the West Bank during a diplomatic visit of the US Secretary of State (Brown 2024). It is clear that Netanyahu takes US support for granted to a certain extent, and is searching for the limit to what he can get away with.
He may have just crossed this line last week, with the tragic attacks on aid workers with World Central Kitchen. On a phone call, President Biden laid down the law, demanding Israel open more crossings into Gaza for aid, increase aid deliveries allowed through the current access points, and announce these changes immediately, or risk losing US support – shortly after the call, new crossings were announced and aid trucks were let in (AP News 2024). President Biden didn’t even have to actually condition aid, he merely leveraged the possibility over the phone, and it resulted in immediate policy adjustment. The lesson for the United States is clear: if you have the leverage, use it. Unconditional aid doesn’t work, that’s why they use leverage with every other country – except Israel.
What caused this shift in foreign policy?
Israel’s military response to the October 7th attacks has been broadly criticized for extreme disregard for civilian lives. According to the Ministry of Health in Gaza, more than 33,000 Palestinians have been killed in Israeli attacks since October 7th, the majority being women and children (Motamedi and Chughtai 2024). Israel swiftly declared a complete siege of Gaza, and very little humanitarian aid of any form has been allowed to enter (Bisset 2024). Now people in northern Gaza are forced to survive on only 245 calories a day, less than a can of beans (Oxfam 2024). Blocking humanitarian aid is illegal under international law. In January, South Africa accused Israel of carrying out genocide in the UN’s highest court – a claim that Israel strongly denies (UN News 2024). More international criticism directed at Israel also means criticism to the US, for providing the means to commit these transgressions. The less popular Israel is globally, the less useful their relations are to the US, ultimately leading to the current disconnect between the two nations.
Once a nonpartisan issue, now relations with Israel are heavily debated and criticized in US domestic politics. An entire generation of young Americans have grown up with a very different image of Israel than their parents. They see Israel as the dominant nation, colonizing and oppressing the Palestinians, while their parents still remember when Israel’s very existence was uncertain (Freilich 2024). To maintain favorability with his democratic base, Biden has been gradually pushed to be more critical of Israel. The demographic shift was ongoing before the war, but the images of unjustifiable cruelty in Gaza has inflamed the issue, bringing it all to a head.
April 14th, 2024
After Iran’s first direct attack on Israel this Saturday, I am amending the conclusion to address the impact this will have on US-Israeli relations. The White House stated that support for Israel is ‘ironclad,’ and while not willing to join a counter-strike, Biden has moved US military forces to the region, and helped take down nearly all of the drones and missiles. He is convening with G7 leaders to coordinate a diplomatic response, and vows to “stay in close touch with Israel’s leaders,” (The White House 2024). The trends towards tension and leveraging aid identified above are still true, but they have been put on hold until this situation plays out. While President Biden is frustrated with the crisis in Gaza and PM Netanyahu’s continued defiance, he is not so offended to turn his back on Israel when they are in need. To hazard a prediction for the future, the growing Iranian threat might just manage to remind these two nations why good relations are worthwhile.
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