Central Asia: Between National Identities and Economic Dependencies
By Dilzhan Kaiypova
Despite differences in language, religion, and culture overall, the USSR had been very successful in constructing a common identity that is well preserved in the minds of the people even after more than thirty years of its dissolution. As a prominent element of this identity, Russian is still spoken, especially by the Central Asian post-Soviet countries.
The very same post-Soviet space, however, has been the most convenient for Russia to insert its domination utilizing conflicts and wars. The most recent example of it is perhaps Ukraine. As Russia waged a full-scale war against Ukraine in February 2022, the perception of Russia in the eyes of Central Asians seems to change immensely, reflecting specifically on their language use. However, its economic dependency on Russia is also playing a vital role in the decisions they make regarding trade and cooperation despite its worsening image in the international arena. The recent efforts made by the EU to prevent, or at least limit, the flow of sanctioned goods to Russia seems to be ineffective. However, it is worth questioning the applicability of these demands, before rendering the region as pro-Russian.
This article will analyse the changes in language use and will make a humble attempt to shed light on the effects the war in Ukraine had on Central Asian identity, focusing on the most recent examples from Kyrgyzstan. The case is worth researching as the region in question seems to be under threat when comments from Russian lawmakers and Putin are considered. The nature of these comments includes but is not limited to analogies of Central Asian countries with Ukraine. In some instances, these countries were even threatened to be handled after Russia is done with Ukraine. Despite nationalist narratives gaining prominence and as a result, threats, the region is not ready to cut its ties with Russia.
The Case of Kyrgyzstan
Despite the lack of a full transition to the language of the titular states, there are significant steps taken by each country toward that goal. One can observe in Kyrgyzstan, for example, one of the most fluent Russian speakers of the region according to survey results[1], that attempts are made for utilizing Kyrgyz in everyday life within the discourse of decolonization. For instance, lawmakers and Bishkek city council members proposed to change the district and street names, to promote the state language, as Bishkek is the only city that kept its Soviet-era street and district names. Parliament speaker Nurlanbek Shakiev suggested the idea recently again in 2022, also adding that every citizen of Kyrgyzstan must know Kyrgyz. However, these suggestions were perceived by Moscow as “an attack on the Russian language and Russians living in Kyrgyzstan”. A warning followed directly from the Duma’s International Affairs Committee chief, Dmitry Novikov himself, as he said that the change may lead to “very serious negative processes” and that “it is better to stop them at the earliest stage”. Interestingly, another comment from a Russian lawmaker Svetlana Zhurova followed as she compared the country’s transition to its own language to that of Georgia and Ukraine[2]. Considering the war in the latter, her words are indeed quite problematic.
One can trace back this discourse to Putin’s election campaigns prior to the second term of his presidency, and his realization of the influence China, the EU, and the United States had on the region, which according to him, should have been limited. He, therefore, initiated various integration projects such as the Eurasian Union as the Commonwealth of Independent Nations (CIS) was rendered too weak for integration. He claimed in 2011 that the Union would become “one of the poles in a future multipolar world”. In Putin’s multipolar world, Russia seems to hope to have Central Asian countries as its mere satellites, as Putin put it already in 2014, that Kazakh people should “remain in the greater Russian world”, as they “never had never had statehood” before the Soviet Union.[3] Ukraine, for example faced a very similar discourse from Russia and had a difficult choice before it: becoming a member of the Eurasian Union or signing the EU trade pact, which was not only an economic decision but also one that would reflect its identity as either post-Soviet or European. At the expense of oversimplification, one can say that the avoidant attitude of then-President Yanukovych led to Euromaidan protests, and following Ukraine’s unwillingness to cooperate with Russia, it saw the annexation of Crimea in 2014, and a full-scale war in 2022.
Similarly, Central Asian states are also striving towards creating and furthering their national identities while continuing their relationship with their biggest trade partner, Russia. In the meantime, the EU is pressing them with demands for guaranteeing that sanctioned goods are not being exported to Russia, a point emphasized recently during the EU Representative O’Sullivan’s visit to Kyrgyzstan. However, it is important to keep in mind that Kyrgyzstan is a part of the Eurasian Economic Union with more than 1 million migrants in Russia, making it an important partner, even in times when the country is re-constructing its own national narratives. It is therefore important for the EU to understand the peculiarities and dynamics in the region and formulate its demands accordingly.
[1] Alexandr, Khokhrin, and Fedorko Viktor. “The dynamics of the number of Russian-speaking title population in the states of Central Asia in the post-Soviet period.” Псковский регионологический журнал 18, no. 2 (2022): 3-20.
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